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"[I]s not the school ground a most important vestige, the one
place where children are entitled to a safe and secure harbor
free of fear and violence? Are not these children the nation's
future? Does Congress really need a hearing or further findings
to recognize the importance of it all?"'
Introduction
The Framers of the Constitution intended the Commerce Clause
to be a specific, narrow power.' Since then, the Commerce Clause has
become a seemingly ubiquitous source of power on which to base leg-
islation. Limits on the commerce power have become less than clear
because congressional statutes facing Commerce Clause attacks have
almost universally been upheld as constitutional.'
The social ills of our country often are national in scope and re-
quire solutions from the federal Congress. School violence is one of
these social ills. The Supreme Court has recognized the severity of the
problem: "In recent years, school disorder has often taken particularly
ugly forms; drugs and violent crime in the school have become major
social problems."4 Statistics on violence in schools are startling.
Eighty-two percent of school district officials recently reported that
student violence had increased over the last five years.' A recent
study suggested that 39.9 percent of male Virginia high school stu-
dents carried a weapon to school during the preceding month.6 An-
other study found that 22 percent of students in some areas carry guns
to school.7 The result of this escalating arsenal is disturbing. Youths
are not only taking arms to school, they are using them. Between July
1, 1992, and May 26, 1994, seventy-four intentional deaths occurred on
school campuses.' Forty-seven of those deaths involved the use of
firearms. 9
1. United States v. Glover, 842 F. Supp. 1327, 1337 (D. Kan. 1994).
2. "The Congress shall have power to ... regulate commerce with foreign nations,
and among several states, and with the Indian Tribes." U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
3. See infra part I.A.
4. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 339 (1985).
5. Amicus Brief for the National School Safety Center at 4, United States v. Lopez, 2
F.3d 1342 (5th Cir. 1993) (No. 93-1260) (citing NATIONAL SCHOOLS BOARDS Assoc., Vio-
LENCE IN THE SCHOOLS: How AMERIcA's SCHOOL BOARDS ARE SAFEGUARDING OUR
CHILDREN (1993)).
6. Id. at 5 (citing VIRGINIA DEP'T OF EDUC., 1992 YOUTH RISK BEHAVIOR SURVEY
REPORT 8 (1992)).
7. Id. (citing NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE AND
DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, GUN ACQUISMON AND POSSESSION IN SELECTED JUVENILE
SAMPLES 5 (1993)).
8. Id. (citing NATIONAL SCHOOL SAFETY CENTER, SCHOOL AsSOCIATED VIoLENT
DEATHS 7 (1994)).
9. Id.
Recently, two federal appellate courts reached opposite conclu-
sions regarding the constitutionality of a federal firearms statute.
These court decisions reflect different views on how far the Commerce
Clause extends. Perhaps more importantly, the split illustrates funda-
mentally different views of federalism, the allocation of power be-
tween the federal government and the states. The split between the
circuits gives the Supreme Court a rare opportunity to further define
the scope of the Commerce Clause and to clarify the balance of power
between states and the federal government.
On September 15, 1993, in United States v. Lopez,'" the Fifth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals held that the Gun-Free School Zones Act
(hereinafter "section 922(q)") n was unconstitutional. Section 922(q)
makes it a felony to possess a firearm within 1,000 feet of a school
zone.12 The lower court convicted Alfonso Lopez, Jr.'3 of possession
of a firearm within a school zone.' 4 The appellate court, however,
held that section 922(q)(1) was unconstitutional because it went be-
yond the reach of the legislature's commerce power.' 5 The court held
that section 922(q) was unconstitutional on its face because neither
congressional findings, nor legislative history, indicated that regulating
gun possession fell within the commerce power.16 Further, section
922(q) failed to specify that it was enacted under the commerce
power.17 Thus, the Lopez court fashioned a new requirement for leg-
islation under the Commerce Clause: Congress must demonstrate, or
at least assert, either in an explicit finding or in the legislative history,
that the regulated activity falls within the commerce power.' 8 The Lo-
pez court took an unprecedented step in limiting the commerce power
and preserving state sovereignty within our federal system.
On December 21, 1993, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals up-
held section 922(q) as constitutional, affirming the conviction of Ray
Harold Edwards III under the Gun-Free School Zones Act.'9 In Ed-
10. 2 F.3d 1342 (5th Cir. 1993), cert. granted, 114 S.Ct. 1536 (1994).
11. 18 U.S.C. § 922(q).
12. 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(1)(A) provides: "It shall be unlawful for any individual know-
ingly to possess a firearm at a place that the individual knows, or has reasonable cause to
believe, is a school zone." 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(25) defines a school zone as: "(A) in, or on
the grounds of, a public, parochial or private school; or (B) within a distance of 1,000 feet
from the grounds of a public, parochial or private school." 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(25) (Supp.V
1993).
13. Lopez was a twelfth-grade student attending Edison High School in San Antonio,
Texas. Lopez, 2 F.3d at 1345.
14. Id. Lopez arrived at school carrying a concealed .38 caliber handgun. Id.
15. Id. at 1367.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 1366.
18. Id. at 1367.
19. United States v. Edwards, 13 F.3d 291 (9th Cir. 1993).
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wards, neither congressional findings nor the legislative history of the
statute illustrated how possessing a gun within a school zone affects
interstate commerce.2 ° The court held such findings were unneces-
21sary. 1 The court acknowledged that its decision created an intercir-
cuit conflict with the Fifth Circuit.2 However, the Edwards court
rejected the reasoning of Lopez, explaining that Supreme Court pre-
cedent does not require congressional findings in order to legislate.
23
Essentially, different views of federalism underlie the divergent
conclusions of the Fifth and Ninth Circuits on the constitutionality of
section 922(q). Lopez, by requiring Congress to make preliminary
findings that the activity being regulated falls within a specifically enu-
merated constitutional power, attempts to constrict the burgeoning
commerce power and keep Congress from regulating areas of law tra-
ditionally reserved to the states. Edwards, by holding such a prelimi-
nary finding unnecessary, maintains the existing balance of power
between the federal government and the states. The Supreme Court
granted certiorari to the Lopez case and now has an opportunity to
clarify what Congress must do in order to exercise Commerce Clause
powers. According to existing Commerce Clause precedent, which
does not require Congress to make preliminary findings linking the
regulated activity to a constitutional power, section 922(q) is
constitutional.24
This Note examines the constitutionality of the Gun-Free School
Zones Act in light of the intercircuit split and focuses on the necessity
of making preliminary findings for statutes. Part I discusses the gen-
eral scope of the Commerce Clause, the necessity of legislative find-
ings, and recent Tenth Amendment jurisprudence. Part II summarizes
cases which address the constitutionality of section 922(q), including
Lopez, Edwards, and other federal district court decisions. Part III
discusses the recent amendments to section 922(q) which provide find-
ings linking the possession of guns to interstate commerce. These
findings may cure the constitutional defects the Fifth Circuit found in
section 922(q). Part IV discusses the greater federalism concerns
which Lopez implicates. This section also summarizes Tenth Amend-
ment arguments made opposing section 922(q), and analyzes how the
Supreme Court may be prepared to entertain such Tenth Amendment
arguments in light of recent decisions. Part V, the conclusion, pro-
poses that the Supreme Court uphold section 922(q) as constitutional,
20. Id. at 293.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 294.
23. Id.
24. See infra part I.B.
25. VIOLENT CRIME CONTROL AND LAW ENFORCEMENT ACT OF 1994, H.R. CONF.
REP. No. 711, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. at 342 (1994).
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reverse Lopez, and maintain the status quo regarding legislative
findings.26
I. Background
A. The Scope of the Commerce Power
The Constitution grants Congress the power to enact legislation
only on specific enumerated subjects.27 All subjects outside these
enumerated powers are reserved for the states to regulate by the
Tenth Amendment.' One of these enumerated powers, perhaps the
most expansive, is the power to regulate interstate commerce.2 9
The Supreme Court has consistently upheld statutes under consti-
tutional attack based on the commerce power. In the process, the
Court has expanded the range of activities which affect interstate com-
merce. Today Congress has great freedom to regulate activities which
do not appear to affect interstate commerce.
The first significant Supreme Court case involving the scope of
the commerce power is Gibbons v. Ogden.30 Gibbons involved a dis-
pute over exclusive navigation fights in New York waters.3 ' The
plaintiff transported passengers in his steamboats between New York
and New Jersey.32 New York state granted plaintiff the exclusive
rights to this shipping activity, excluding out-of-state shipping compet-
itors from navigating the harbor. When the defendant, a New Jersey
shipping competitor, traveled the same waters as the plaintiff, the
plaintiff sought an injunction against the defendant. 3 The Supreme
Court dismissed the plaintiff's action, holding that a state may not
grant exclusive navigation rights which conflict with interstate com-
26. See GLENN HARLAN REYNOLDS, KIDS, GUNS, AND THE COMMERCE CLAUSE: Is
THE COURT READY FOR CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT?, (Cato Institute Policy Policy
Analysis No. 216, Oct. 10, 1994), for an argument that United States v. Lopez should be
affirmed to enforce the original constitutional boundaries and thereby put a limit on spe-
cial interest lobbying of the federal government. See James M. Maloney, Note, Shooting
for an Omnipotent Congress: The Constitutionality of Federal Regulation of Intrastate Fire-
arms Possession, 62 FORDHAM L. REv. 1795 (1994), for a comprehensive argument that
Lopez should be affirmed by the Supreme Court.
27. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
28. "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohib-
ited by it to the states, are reserved to the states respectively, or to the people." U.S.
CONST. amend. X.
29. "Congress shall have the power to... regulate commerce with foreign nations, and
among the several states, and with the Indian tribes." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
30. 22 U.S. 1 (1824).
31. Id,
32. Id.
33. Gibbons v. Ogden, 19 U.S. 448, 448-49 (1821) (dismissed for want of jurisdiction
because no final decree was pronounced in state court).
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merce.14 "America understands, and has uniformly understood, the
word 'commerce' to comprehend navigation," 5 wrote the Court. The
Court noted that the Commerce Clause extends only to those activi-
ties which "affect the States generally; but not .. those which are
completely within a particular State."36
The great bulk of modem Commerce Clause cases occurred after
the 1937 court-packing scare during President Roosevelt's administra-
tion. In order to preserve the Supreme Court's membership at nine,
the Court began to allow Congress to regulate a much broader scope
of activities under the Commerce Clause. For example, United States
v. Darby7 involved the constitutionality of the Fair Labor Standards
Act." The Fair Labor Standards Act prohibited the "shipment in in-
terstate commerce of certain products and commodities produced in
the United States under labor conditions as respects wages and hours
which fail to conform to standards set up by the Act."3 9 The issue
before the Court was whether employment conditions, a purely intra-
state subject, could be regulated by Congress because the lumber pro-
duced by Darby was eventually sold in interstate commerce.40 The
Court held that Congress had the power to regulate the labor condi-
tions under the Commerce Clause because the activity had a substan-
tial effect on interstate commerce.41 The Court also held that
although only a portion of the lumber would be sold outside the state,
Congress could regulate this industry because this portion was inexo-
rably commingled with lumber to be sold in-state.42
In Wickard v. Filburn,43 the Supreme Court developed the sub-
stantial effect test, as well as the aggregate theory of interstate com-
merce. Wickard involved the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938"
which regulated the amount of wheat a farmer could grow per acre.45
The Act's goal was to decrease the production of wheat to increase
demand and keep the price at a certain level.46 The plaintiff grew
34. Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 1.
35. Id. at 190.
36. Id. at 195.
37. 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
38. Id. at 108.
39. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 109 (1941).
40. Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 113.
41. Id. at 123.
42. Id. at 121.
43. 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
44. 7 U.S.C. §§ 1281-393 (1988).
45. "The general scheme of the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938 as related to
wheat is to control the volume moving in interstate and foreign commerce in order to
avoid surpluses and shortages and the consequent abnormally low or high wheat prices and
obstructions to commerce." Wickard, 317 U.S. at 115.
46. Id.
more wheat than his allotted share,4 7 and would have been penalized
by the Act.' He sued the Secretary of Agriculture to enjoin the en-
forcement of the Act alleging that it was unconstitutional.49 The
plaintiff argued that the Act was beyond the scope of the commerce
power because it was a "regulation of production and consumption of
wheat. ' 50 These activities, "local in character," have only an "indi-
rect" effect on interstate commerce, he argued." The Supreme Court
created a new "substantial effect" standard. 2 The Court held that
although plaintiff's "own contribution to the demand for wheat [was]
trivial," this alone was not enough to "remove him from the scope of
federal regulation where... his contribution, taken together with that
of many others similarly situated, [was] far from trivial. '53 Thus, Con-
gress now had the power to regulate activities which individually did
not substantially affect interstate commerce but did when taken in
aggregate.
The Supreme Court granted congressional statutes even more
deference in the 1960's with the development of the rational basis test.
The rational basis test first appeared in Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v.
United States.54 In Heart of Atlanta, the issue was whether section 201
of the Civil Rights Act of 196455 could be used to prevent the defend-
ant's motel from turning away blacks on the basis of their race. 6 The
appellate court affirmed an injunction restraining the Heart of Atlanta
Motel from refusing to lodge blacks. The defendant motel-owner ar-
gued that the Act was unconstitutional and beyond the scope of the
commerce power because turning away blacks did not affect interstate
commerce.5 7 The Supreme Court disagreed, acknowledging that Con-
gress had voluminous testimony in the legislative history which linked
47. Id. at 114. The plaintiff was limited by the terms of the Act to harvest only 11.1 of
his 23 acres. He sowed all 23 acres, and harvested an excess of 239 bushels of wheat. Id.
48. Id. at 114-15. The excess wheat "constituted farm marketing excess, subject to a
penalty of 49 cents a bushel, or $117.11 in all." Id.
49. Id. at 113.
50. Id. at 119.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 125. "But even if appellee's activity be local and though it may not be re-
garded as commerce, it may still, whatever its nature, be reached by Congress if it exerts a
substantial economic effect on interstate commerce, and this irrespective of whether such
effect is what might at some earlier time have been defined as 'direct' or 'indirect."' Id.
53. Id. at 127-28.
54. 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
55. The Civil Rights Act provides in part that "all persons shall be entitled to the full
and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities,... and accommodations of any place
of public accommodation... without discrimination or segregation on the ground of race,
color, religion, or national origin." 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(9) (1994).
56. Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 249.
57. Id. at 243-44.
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racial discrimination with interstate commerce.58 The Court held that
as long as Congress has a rational basis for finding that the regulated
activity affects interstate commerce, the Court will not question the
constitutional basis for the statute.59
The Supreme Court reiterated the rational basis test in Katzen-
bach v. McClung. 0 In McClung,61 the defendant owned and operated
a family restaurant which refused to serve black patrons in the dining
area.2 The Attorney General of Alabama sought to prevent this ra-
cially biased treatment by enforcing the Civil Rights Act of 1964
against the defendant's restaurant.63 The defendant restaurant-owner
won an injunction in the lower court, preventing the Attorney Gen-
eral of Alabama from enforcing the statute against him.' The lower
court found the statute unconstitutional. 61 The Supreme Court re-
versed the injunction and upheld the statute as constitutional. The
Court examined the legislative history to determine whether a rational
basis existed. "Where we find that the legislators, in light of the facts
and testimony before them, have a rational basis for finding a chosen
regulatory scheme necessary to the protection of commerce, our in-
vestigation is at an end."166 Again, the Court deferred to Congress
regarding the constitutional basis for a statute, where Congress had a
rational basis to make such a determination.
In Perez v. United States,67 the Supreme Court broadened the
commerce power even more. Perez was convicted of loan sharking
under Title II of the Consumer Credit Protection Act.68 He appealed
his conviction on the grounds that the Act was unconstitutional and
beyond the scope of the commerce power because his loan sharking
activities were purely intrastate and had no effect on interstate com-
merce.69 The Court rejected this argument, holding that all that was
necessary to uphold the statute was a showing that the defendant's
activities were in a class of activities within reach of federal power.70
58. Id. at 252.
59. Id. at 258-59. "The only question[ ... [is] whether Congress had a rational basis
for finding that racial discrimination by motels affected commerce." Id.
60. 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
61. Id.
62. Id. at 296. The restaurant offered a carry out service for blacks. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 295.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 303-04.
67. 402 U.S. 146 (1971).
68. 18 U.S.C. §§ 891-96 (1988).
69. Perez, 402 U.S. at 146. Perez was convicted of loan sharking with a butcher, to
whom he loaned money to help open his business. Id No evidence of other out of state
activity was produced. Id.
70. Id. at 154.
Justice Douglas said, "where the class of activities is regulated and
that class is within the reach of federal power, the courts have no
power "to excise, as trivial, individual instances' of the class."'" Thus,
because loan sharking was in a class of activities which affected inter-
state commerce, defendant's particular activities were as well, even
though they were conducted on a purely local scale.
The Supreme Court has given Congress great freedom to legislate
under the Commerce Clause. However, it cannot yet be considered a
"blank check." Whether Congress can legislate without making a pre-
liminary finding linking the regulated activity with interstate com-
merce is still in doubt.
B. Legislative Findings of Constitutionality
Few Supreme Court cases have explicitly addressed whether Con-
gress must demonstrate a nexus between the regulated activity and
the power on which the statute is based. The cases that exist seem to
offer a fairly clear rule: preliminary findings are not required to legis-
late. However, even though no such demonstration is required of
Congress, the Court often relies on legislative" findings to aid its con-
stitutional analysis. This contradiction creates confusion as to what
exactly Congress must do to legislate within the bounds of the Consti-
tution. Should courts follow the words of the Supreme Court and not
require findings? Or should they infer a rule from the Supreme
Court's reliance on legislative findings?72
Archibald Cox examined the history of legislative findings to sup-
port congressional action. Although his work is almost 30 years old,
his observations remain valuable. In his foreword to a review of the
1965 Supreme Court term,73 Cox concluded that legislative findings
were unnecessary to support the constitutionality of federal statutes.7 4
Prior to the 1930s, Cox observed, Congress was not required to make
findings because cases often upheld "legislation under the commerce
clause.., which apparently rested upon factual conclusions for which
71. Id. (emphasis omitted) (quoting Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 193 (1968).
72. Courts should articulate a rule explicitly to insure its precedential effect. But see
John Wallace, Comment, Stare Decisis and the Rehnquist Court: The Collision of Activism,
Passivism and Politics in Casey, 42 BUFF. L. REv. 187, 235 (1994) (citing Robert A.
Sprecher, THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE DoCTRINE OF STARE DECISIS AND THE EXTENT TO
WHICH IT SHOULD BE APPLIED, 31 A.B.A. J. 501,502-03 (1945)) for an argument that the
binding force of stare decisis does not come from the words used, nor reasons given by a
judge for a particular decision, but from the principles necessary for the decision of the
case.
73. Archibald Cox, Foreword. Constitutional Adjudication and the Promotion of
Human Rights, 80 HARV. L. REV. 91 (1966).
74. Id. at 105.
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no legislative record could be cited."'75 Cox then summarized the in-
creasing use of legislative findings by courts during the 1930s:
In the 1930's, when experience had taught the importance of in-
forming the judges about the social and economic conditions
giving rise to legislation, it became the federal practice to pres-
ent the evidence to congressional committees, to make a record
in the committee reports and on the floor, and to embody the
desired conclusions in statutory findings. Presentation of the
case upon judicial review of the constitutionality of a statute
thus assumed some of the appearance of judicial review of the
record of an administrative hearing for the purpose of determin-
ing whether the agency's findings and order rest upon substan-
tial evidence .... The analogy, however, is only superficial, and
the practice of relying upon the legislative record when it exists
should not be taken to show that such a record is required.6
Cox observed that although it has become frequent practice for courts
to refer to the legislative record to determine the constitutionality of
congressional action, "no case has ever held that a record is constitu-
tionally required."77
Cox offered a rationale for the judiciary's deference toward Con-
gress. According to Cox, the judiciary's deference
rests upon appreciation of the fact that the fundamental basis
for legislative action is the knowledge, experience, and judg-
ment of the people's representatives, only a small part, or even
none, of which may come from the hearings and reports of com-
mittees or debates upon the floor.7s
The Supreme Court cases support Cox's interpretation to a large
degree.
The Court's deference to Congress is demonstrated by the pre-
sumption of constitutionality accorded statutes.79 This presumption
was first articulated in United States v. Carolene Products Co.80 In
Carolene Products, the defendant challenged the Filled Milk Act8 on
the grounds that the Act was unconstitutional and beyond the scope
of the commerce power." The Supreme Court upheld the Act and
75. Id. See, e.g., United States v. Ferger, 250 U.S. 199 (1919); Southern Ry. v. United
States, 222 U.S. 20 (1911).
76. Cox, supra note 73, at 105 (emphasis added).
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. See McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420,425-26 (1961); United States v. Carolene
Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938); United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 67 (1936) (dic-
tum); Metropolitan Casualty Ins. Co. v. Brownell, 294 U.S. 580, 584 & n.1 (1935); Legal
Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457, 531 (1871).
80. 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
81. Id. See also ch. 262, 42 Stat. 1486 (1988) (current version at 21 U.S.C §§ 61-64
(1994)).
82. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. at 145-46.
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defined the scope of the presumption of constitutionality. The Court
held,
Even in the absence of [legislative findings] the existence of
facts supporting the legislative judgment is to be presumed...
unless in the light of the facts made known or generally assumed
it is of such a character as to _preclude the assumption that it
rests upon some rational basis."
Thus, although Congress made extensive findings on how filled milk
affected public health and interstate commerce, such findings were not
required to uphold the constitutionality of the statute. The Court ex-
plicitly stated that findings were not required, although it relied on
legislative findings to determine whether the activity had a relation to
interstate commerce.8
Congress' responsibilities regarding legislative findings were elab-
orated on in United States v. Darby.5 In sustaining the constitutional-
ity of a statute, the Darby Court indicated that Congress was not
required to find that the regulated activity had an effect on interstate
commerce. s6 The Court noted that
Congress has sometimes left it to the courts to determine
whether the intrastate activities have the prohibited effect on
[interstate] commerce .... It has sometimes left it to an admin-
istrative board or agency to determine whether the activities
sought to be regulated or prohibited have such effect .... And
sometimes Congress itself has said that a particular activity af-
fects commerce.87
The Court then gave examples of constitutional statutes enacted
under all three scenarios,88 implying that all were acceptable and
equally constitutional.
In Woods v. Cloyd W. Miller Co.,8 9 the Court went a step further
and held that Congress need not demonstrate that the regulated activ-
ity affects interstate commerce, nor indicate that it is invoking the
commerce power. In the Court's words, "the constitutionality of ac-
tion taken by Congress does not depend on recitals of the power
which it undertakes to exercise." 9° Here the Court clearly demarcated
the respective functions of the legislative and judicial branches. The
legislature may legislate without giving a thought to the source of the
constitutional power or how the regulated activity relates to that
83. Id. at 152.
84. Id. Again, the problem is whether courts should do as the Court says or does. See
supra note 72.
85. 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
86. Id. at 118.
87. Id. at 120.
88. Id. at 120-21.
89. 333 U.S. 138 (1948).
90. Id at 144.
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power. The judiciary alone will undertake to determine the constitu-
tional validity of the statute. Nonetheless, the Woods Court consulted
the statute's legislative history in its analysis of the constitutional
question.9 '
In Katzenbach v. McClung,9' the Supreme Court reviewed the
constitutionality of Title II of the Civil Rights Act.9 3 The McClung
Court reiterated its rule that Congress has no obligation to make legis-
lative findings.94 In the Court's words, "no formal findings were
made, which of course are not necessary." 95 Again, the Court ana-
lyzed the legislative history of the Act to aid its determination of the
constitutionality of the statutef 6
In Katzenbach v. Morgan,97 the Supreme Court applied the same
deference toward Congress for a statute enacted under the Equal Pro-
tection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In reviewing the con-
stitutionality of section 4(e) of the Voting Rights Act of 1965,98 the
Court deferred to Congress judgment that the regulated activity fell
within its power.99 "[lit is not for us to review the congressional reso-
lution of these factors," the Court wrote, "It is enough that we be able
to perceive a basis upon which the Congress might resolve the conflict
as it did."'" As Archibald Cox noted, "The choice of words cannot
have been casual.... Implicit in the reasoning is the proposition that
the basis for the congressional determination need not appear in the
legislative record.""'1 The principle seems to apply to all statutes en-
acted by Congress, because the Court has applied it to statutes en-
acted under both the commerce power and the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Although, as Cox laments,
"[O]ne wishes that the point might have been treated more
explicitly."'10
The most recent case in which the Supreme Court addressed the
issue of legislative findings of constitutionality was Perez v. United
States.' 3 In Perez, the Court reviewed the constitutionality of Title II
of the Consumer Credit Protection Act.1 0° Again, the Court deferred
91. Id.
92. 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
93. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (1988).
94. McClung, 379 U.S. at 299.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 299-300.
97. 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
98. 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(e) (1964 ed., Supp. I).
99. Morgan, 384 U.S. at 653.
100. Id.
101. Cox, supra note 73 at 104.
102. Id.
103. 402 U.S. 146 (1971).
104. 18 U.S.C. §§ 891-96 (Supp. V 1964).
GUN-FREE SCHOOL ZONES ACT
to legislative judgment in determining whether loan sharking affected
interstate commerce.1°5 Although the Court reviewed the legislative
history of the Act, it explicitly stated that no such legislative history
was required.1°6 The Court noted, "We have mentioned in detail the
economic, financial, and social setting of the problem as revealed to
Congress. We do so not to infer that Congress need make particular-
ized findings in order to legislate."'" 7 Once more, as in previous cases,
the Supreme Court asserted the rule that Congress need not make
findings, either explicitly or in the legislative history. Again, however,
the Court used the legislative history to analyze the constitutionality
of the statute.
C. Federalism Revived? Recent Tenth Amendment Jurisprudence of
the Supreme Court
While the Framers of the Constitution likely did not envision the
tremendous expansion the Commerce Clause would experience in the
twentieth century, they did create a check on the federal government's
power. The Tenth Amendment reserves power to the states to regu-
late any area not specifically reserved to the federal government. 08
In theory, the Tenth Amendment is an elegant division of power be-
tween the federal and state government. Before 1968, the Tenth
Amendment was invoked, however, only sparingly by the Supreme
Court. In the last twenty-five years, the Supreme Court has invoked
the Tenth Amendment more frequently to preserve state sovereignty.
There are signs that the Court is prepared to limit congressional
power to invade areas of traditional state jurisdiction. In fact, Lopez
may provide an opportunity for the Court to limit congressional use of
the Commerce Clause and redefine the federalist balance. Such ac-
tion would be unwise in light of the crime in our schools today, a prob-
lem the Gun-Free School Zones Act addresses.
Modern debate over the Tenth Amendment began with three
cases involving the Fair Labor Standards Act. The issue in all three
cases was whether the federal minimum wage standards, as set forth in
the Fair Labor Standards Act, applied to the states.
In Maryland v. Wirtz," 9 the Court held that the minimum wage
standards applied to state schools and hospitals. The Court explicitly
gave greater weight to the commerce power over notions of state soy-
105. Perez, 402 U.S. at 156.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. The Tenth Amendment provides: "The powers not delegated to the United States
by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the states respec-
tively, or to the people." U.S. CONST. amend. X.
109. 392 U.S. 183 (1968).
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ereignty.110 The Court reasoned that the federal government
may override countervailing state interests whether these be de-
scribed as "governmental" or "proprietary" in character ....
This Court will not carve up the commerce power to protect en-
terprises indistinguishable in their effect on commerce from pri-
vate businesses, simply because those enterprises happen to be
run by the States for the benefit of their citizens.'
Eight years later, National League of Cities v. Usery"1 2 expressly
overruled Wirtz by a narrow 5-4 vote." 3 In National League of Cities,
the Court claimed it "has never doubted that there are limits upon the
power of Congress to override state sovereignty, even when exercising
its otherwise plenary powers to tax or to regulate commerce.""' 4 The
Court added that it is not within Congress' commerce power "to di-
rectly displace the states' freedom to structure integral operations in
areas of traditional governmental functions""' 5 or "to force directly
upon the States [Congress'] choices as to how essential decisions re-
garding the conduct of integral governmental functions are to be
made.""' 6 The Court invoked the Tenth Amendment to protect states
sovereign power to control their "traditional" or "integral" govern-
ment functions.
The Court's new interest in protecting state sovereignty would
last only nine years. In Garcia v. San Antonio Metro Transit Author-
ity,117 the Court again reversed its position on the applicability of the
Fair Labor Standards Act to non-federal entities." 8 The issue in the
case was whether the federal minimum wage standards applied to a
municipally owned and operated mass transit system. The Court held
that the standards did apply, expressly overruling Usery and reinstat-
ing Wirtz." 9 Again the margin was a narrow 5-4 vote, with Justice
Blackmun casting the swing vote. Finding the Usery rule unworkable,
the Court held that states must look to the national political process
for protection from congressional regulation under the Commerce
Clause.' z0 In the Court's words, "state sovereign interests, then, are
more properly protected by procedural safeguards inherent in the
structure of the federal system than by judicially created limitations
110. Id. at 195.
111. Id. at 198-99 (footnote omitted).
112. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
113. Id. at 840.
114. Id. at 842.
115. Id. at 852.
116. 1& at 855.
117. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
118. Id. at 556-57.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 554.
on federal power."'' However, Garcia did leave open the possibility
that states could be protected from legislation under the Commerce
Clause if "possible failings" in the political process occurred.' 22 Thus,
after Garcia, the vitality of the Tenth Amendment was again uncer-
tain. Indeed, according to the dissent, the Garcia majority held the
"unprecedented view that Congress is free under the Commerce
Clause to assume a State's traditional sovereign power, and to do so
without judicial review of its action.""
The Court reaffirmed Garcia in South Carolina v. Baker,'24 hold-
ing that states are protected from legislation based on the Commerce
Clause only by the national political process."z The Court altered the
"possible failings" exception of Garcia, however. Where "extraordi-
nary defects" occur in the national political process, courts will step in
to protect the states. 26
Gregory v. Ashcroft'27 marked renewed interest by the Court in
the Tenth Amendment. The Court articulated the "plain statement
rule," which provides that "[i]f Congress intends to alter the 'usual
constitutional balance between the States and the Federal Govern-
ment,' it must make its intention to do so 'unmistakably clear in the
language of the statute.""'  Gregory seems to invite the search for
traditional government functions which Garcia explicitly disapproved.
The four remaining justices of the Garcia majority strongly dissented.
The most recent case invoking the Tenth Amendment to protect
states sovereignty is New York v. United States.'2 9 New York involved
the constitutionality of the Low Level Radioactive Waste Act of
1985,130 which was designed to solve the shortage of sites for disposal
of radioactive waste.' 3' The third provision of the Act, known as the
"take title" provision, forced states to provide disposal facilities or
take title to the waste.' 32 The issue was whether the "take title" provi-
sion was within the commerce power, or whether it violated state sov-
ereignty guaranteed by the Tenth Amendment.3 3 In its analysis, the
Court ignored its own recent precedent: "This case presents no occa-
121. Id. at 558.
122. 1& at 554.
123. Id. at 575.
124. 485 U.S. 505 (1988).
125. Id. at 512.
126. Id.
127. 501 U.S. 452 (1991).
128. 1d. at 460-61 (quoting Ataseadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234,242 (1985)
(alteration in original)).
129. 112 S. Ct. 2408 (1992).
130. Id. at 2414.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 2416.
133. Id.
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sion to apply or revisit the holdings of any of these cases [Wirtz, Na-
tional League of Cities, or Garcia], as this is not a case in which
Congress has subjected a State to the same legislation applicable to
private parties."'34 Instead, the Court invoked federalism principles
to declare the "take title" provision of the statute unconstitutional:
In this provision, Congress has not held out the threat of exer-
cising its spending power or its commerce power; it has instead
held out the threat, should the States not regulate according to
one federal instruction, of simply forcing the States to submit to
another federal instruction. A choice between two unconstitu-
tionally coercive regulatory techniques is no choice at all.135
In light of New York and Ashcroft, the Court's disinterest in Gar-
cia, and the departure of Justice Blackmun, the Court may be pre-
pared to expand its protection of the state sovereignty through the
Tenth Amendment. United States v. Lopez may provide just such a
vehicle. While Lopez hinges on the necessity of legislative findings,
overtones of federalism pervade the opinion.
H. Cases Involving the Constitutionality of the Gun-Free
School Zones Act
The first reported case to challenge the constitutionality of the
Gun-Free School Zones Act was a Fifth Circuit case, United States v.
Lopez.136 Lopez struck down the statute as unconstitutional, sparking
similar challenges to the statute in other jurisdictions. 137 Approxi-
mately six months later, in United States v. Edwards, the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals upheld the statute as constitutional.138 What fol-
lows is a summary of both cases, and a critique of their legal reasoning
based on Supreme Court precedent. Also included is an examination
of federal district court cases which have addressed the constitutional-
ity of section 922(q). The issue of whether preliminary findings to
support the exercise of a constitutional power are required has cre-
ated a principled debate, dividing the federal courts almost equally.
The Supreme Court decision next year will be eagerly anticipated by
many.
A. United States v. Lopez: A Summary and Critique
On March 10, 1992, twelfth-grader Alfonso Lopez carried a con-
cealed .38 caliber handgun to his high school.139 Although the gun
134. New York v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 2408, 2420 (1992) (citations omitted).
135. Id. at 2428.
136. 2 F.3d 1342 (5th Cir. 1993).
137. Id. at 1367-68.
138. 13 F.3d 291 (9th Cir. 1993).
139. 2 F.3d at 1345.
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was unloaded, Lopez carried five bullets with him."4 ° He planned to
give the gun to a classmate in exchange for forty dollars. 4' The gun
was to be used in a gang war after school.' 42 School officials received
an anonymous tip, confronted Lopez, and retrieved the gun. 4 3
Lopez was charged with violating section 922(q).'" At his trial,
Lopez moved to dismiss the indictment on the grounds that section
922(q) is unconstitutional because it "does not appear to have been
enacted in furtherance of any of those enumerated powers" which the
Constitution grants to Congress. 45 The district court denied the mo-
tion, holding that section 922(q) "is a constitutional exercise of Con-
gress' well-defined power to regulate activities in and affecting
commerce."' 46 Lopez was found guilty and sentenced to six months
imprisonment and two years of supervised release. 47
On appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, Lopez
again challenged the constitutionality of section 922(q).148 The Lopez
court reversed the conviction, holding section 922(q) unconstitu-
tional. 49 To support its opinion, the court analogized to United States
v. Bass,5 ' other federal firearm statutes, and Supreme Court cases
involving the necessity of legislative findings.
1. Analogy to United States v. Bass
The court first analogized the Lopez case to a similar Supreme
Court case, United States v. Bass.'51 In Bass, the Supreme Court re-
viewed the constitutionality of section 1202(a)(1) of the Omnibus
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (hereinafter "section
1202").12 Section 1202 provides that a person convicted of a felony
"who receives, possesses, or transports in commerce or affecting com-
merce.., any firearm" shall be punished in accordance with the stat-
ute. The issue before the Court in Bass was whether the words "in
interstate commerce" applied to all three of the prohibited activities,






145. Id. (quoting appellant).





150. 404 U.S. 336 (1971).
151. Lopez, 2 F.3d at 1347.
152. Act of June 19, 1968, 18 U.S.C. app. § 1202(a)(repealed 1986).
153. Bass, 404 U.S. at 338.
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holding that "in interstate commerce" applied to all three prohibited
activities. 15 4 The Court explained that "unless Congress conveys its
purpose clearly, it will not be deemed to have significantly changed
the federal-state balance."' 5 A contrary reading of section 1202
would make it a federal offense for a felon to merely possess a fire-
arm, without requiring a showing of a connection to interstate com-
merce. This would "dramatically intrude[] upon traditional state
criminal jurisdiction.' 56 Thus, the Court resolved the ambiguity in the
statute by requiring the interstate commerce nexus for all three
activities.'5 7
The Lopez court applied this principle to the Gun-Free School
Zones Act.1 58 The court implied that, because section 922(q) similarly
prohibits possession of firearms in certain contexts, it must also "in-
trude[ ] upon traditional state criminal jurisdiction."'159 Therefore, the
Lopez court found, section 922(q) is unconstitutional. 60
The Bass court's reasoning is inapplicable to Lopez because Bass
involved an issue of statutory interpretation, not a constitutional is-
sue.161 The Bass court invoked the rule of lenity,162 which requires
that where two competing interpretations of a statute exist, the inter-
pretation most favorable to the defendant must be adopted. 63 In
Bass, the rule of lenity dictated that an interstate nexus must be estab-
lished separately for each activity of receiving, possessing, and trans-
porting a firearm. Bass did not hold that an interstate nexus is
required in all cases for all activities. In Lopez, the statute is not am-
biguous. The issue is not how to interpret section 922(q), but whether
it is beyond the bounds of the commerce power. Bass and Lopez ad-
dress fundamentally different questions and deserve different
treatment.
The Bass court's assertion that criminal law is a subject of tradi-
tional state jurisdiction is also questionable.164 Congress has enacted
firearm legislation extensively in this century. In fact, the Lopez opin-
154. Id. at 347.
155. Id. at 349.
156. Id. at 350.
157. Id. at 347.
158. 2 F.3d at 1364-68.
159. Bass, 404 U.S. at 350.
160. Lopez, 2 F.3d at 1347. The Court does not directly explain how the Bass rule is
applicable to Lopez. It summarizes the Bass decision without applying it to the facts of
Lopez. See Lopez, 2 F.3d at 1347.
161. Bass, 404 U.S. at 339.
162. Id. at 347.
163. See id. at 336, 347 (1971); Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S. 808, 812 (1971).
164. Bass, 404 U.S. at 336, 349.
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ion documents this extensive history." This legislation has generally
been upheld as constitutional.' 66 Lopez offers no other evidence to
suggest that firearms legislation is exclusively within the jurisdiction of
the states. Thus, it seems clear that federal legislation proscribing fire-
arm possession does not invade the exclusive jurisdiction of the states.
As a result, the Bass opinion provides virtually no meaningful support
for Lopez.
2. Most Federal Firearm Statutes Require an Interstate Nexus for Each
Individual Case
The Lopez court found section 922(q) unconstitutional because it
does not require that a connection to interstate commerce be proved
in each case. 67 Most federal firearms statutes require the prosecution
to prove such a connection. In the court's words, "[W]ith the excep-
tion of a few relatively recent, special case provisions, federal laws
proscribing firearm possession require the government to prove a con-
nection to commerce, or other federalizing feature, in individual
cases."
168
The Lopez court attempted to distinguish section 922(q) from
other federal firearms statutes which do not require a connection to
interstate. The court began with firearm statutes which involve feder-
ally licensed dealers, manufacturers, or importers. The court ex-
plained that those who choose to hold a federal license, or to deal with
federal licensees, may be required in reference to the activities li-
censed to conform to federal requirements. 69 These federal licensing
requirements alleviate the need for a connection to interstate
165. Lopez, 2 F.3d at 1348-60. See, National Firearms Act of 1934, 26 U.S.C. §§ 5801-
5872 (1988 & Supp.V 1993) (originally codified in 26 U.S.C. § 1132, 48 Stat. 1236 (1934);
Federal Firearms Act of 1938, 15 U.S.C. §§ 901-940, 52 Stat. 1250 (repealed 1968); Omni-
bus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. §§ 901-907,921-928,82 Stat. 197
(1968) (current version at 18 U.S.C. §§ 921-930) (repealing Federal Firearms Act of 1938);
Gun Control Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. §§ 921-928, 82 Stat. 1213 (amending Omnibus Crime
Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968); Firearms Owners' Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 922-
929, 100 Stat. 449 (amending Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968); Unde-
tectable Firearms Act of 1988, 102 Stat. 3816 (amending 18 U.S.C. § 922(p)); Anti-Drug
Abuse Amendments Act of 1988, 102 Stat. 4184, 4361 (adding 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(f)-(g),
930); Crime Control Act of 1990, 104 Stat. 4789 (amending 18 U.S.C. §§ 922, 930); Gun-
Free Zone Act of 1990, 104 Stat. 4844 (adding 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)).
166. One district court noted in United States v. Holland, 841 F.Supp. 143 (E.D. Pa.
1993), that courts have upheld two other subsections of Section 922 involving only intra-
state activity. See United States v. King, 532 F.2d 505, 510 (5th Cir. 1976) (upholding Sec-
tion 922(a), a statute which makes it illegal for an unlicensed dealer to sell firearms
intrastate); United States v. Hale, 978 F.2d 1016, 1018 (8th Cir. 1993) (upholding Section
922(o), which regulates the possession of machine guns and has no interstate requirement).
167. Lopez, 2 F.3d at 1368.
168. Id. at 1347.
169. Id. at 1348 & n.9.
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commerce.
170
The Lopez court then attempted to distinguish section 922(q)
from the seven "recent, special case provisions" in section 922 which
do not contain an interstate commerce nexus requirement. 71 Federal
firearm statutes which are not subject to the nexus requirement, but
which nevertheless have been upheld as constitutional are 18 U.S.C.
§§ 922(a)(6), (b)(1), (b)(2), (b)(4), and (m).172
The court also distinguished 18 U.S.C. § 922(d). 73 Section
922(d) prohibits the transfer of firearms to certain disqualified per-
sons, such as felons and fugitives.' 74 Section 922(d) does not contain
an explicit nexus requirement, yet has not been held unconstitutional.
The court distinguished section 922(d) from section 922(q), arguing
that section 922(d) "deals with transfers, not mere possession.' 75
This distinction was endorsed in United States v. Nelson, 7 6 where the
Fifth Circuit noted that "acquisition of firearms is more closely related
to interstate commerce than mere possession.'
' 77
Eighteen U.S.C. § 922(o) also lacks a nexus requirement. 78 Sec-
tion 922(o) makes it unlawful for "any person to transfer or possess a
machine gun."' 79 The Lopez court distinguished section 922(o) even
though the statute is closely analogous to section 922(q).' 80 The court
argued that because section 922(o) is "restricted to a narrow class of
highly destructive, sophisticated weapons," it implicitly suggests a con-
nection to interstate commerce which section 922(q) does not.' 8 '
Therefore, no express tie to interstate commerce is required with sec-
tion 922(o).18
The Lopez court also distinguished 18 U.S.C. § 922(p) as a "re-
cent, special case provision.' 8 3 Section 922(p) makes it unlawful for
any person to "manufacture, import, ship, deliver, possess, transfer, or
receive" any firearms not detectable "when subjected to inspection by
the type of x-ray machines commonly used at airports."'" Again, sec-
tion 922(p) criminalizes mere possession of a firearm in absence of a
170. Id.
171. Id. at 1348.
172. Id.
173. Lopez, 2 F.3d at 1354.
174. 18 U.S.C. § 922 (1988); see Lopez, 2 F.3d at 1354.
175. Lopez, 2 F.3d at 1354.
176. 458 F.2d 556 (5th Cir. 1972).
177. Id. at 559.
178. Lopez, 2 F.3d at 1356.
179. 18 U.S.C. § 922(o)(1) (1988); see Lopez, 2 F.3d at 1356.
180. Lopez, 2 F.3d at 1356.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. 18 U.S.C. § 922(p) (Supp.V 1993); see Lopez, 2 F.3d at 1356.
184. 18 U.S.C. § 922(p)(1)(B) (Supp.V 1993); see Lopez, 2 F.3d at 1356.
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nexus requirement. The Lopez court distinguished section 922(p)
from section 922(q) because language regarding airports in the statute
"plainly reflects the act's interstate commerce related purpose and
nexus."'185 Thus, the court implicitly found a commerce connection in
section 922(p), unlike section 922(q).
The Lopez court's attempts to distinguish these special case pro-
visions from section 922(q) are strained and unconvincing. Two exam-
ples highlight the court's failure to adequately distinguish these
provisions from section 922(q).
In distinguishing section 922(q) from section 922(o), a statute
which prohibits the possession of a machine gun, the court concludes
that possession of a machine gun "is more suggestive of a nexus to or
effect on interstate or foreign commerce than possession of any fire-
arms whatever."' 8 6 The court reasons that a machine gun, simply be-
cause it is a sophisticated weapon, is more likely to have a connection
to interstate commerce than most firearms. Sophistication is no basis
for a firearm's connection to interstate commerce. Sophisticated
weapons can be used in used and manufactured in an intrastate just as
easily as unsophisticated weapons.
The commerce connection the court infers for section 922(p) is
also unconvincing. Section 922(p) prohibits possession of firearms
which are undetectable in airport x-ray machines.187 The Lopez court
found that section 922(p) implies a connection with interstate com-
merce because firearms which are undetectable in airport x-ray ma-
chines are manufactured for the purpose of being transported by
airplane. 88 Therefore, the court assumes that such weapons will be
transported in interstate commerce in the future. Because transporta-
tion by airplane is often interstate, the court assumes interstate com-
merce must necessarily be implicated. This assumption is
unwarranted. Such a firearm may never enter interstate commerce.
For example, a defendant may possess a prohibited weapon within the
same state as the place of manufacture. This weapon would never
have entered interstate commerce. To infer a commerce nexus for
weapons simply because they can't be detected by x-ray is extraordi-
nary. Although Lopez contends that most recent federal firearms
statutes require a connection with commerce in individual cases, 89
upon a close analysis the court fails to support this contention. 90
185. Lopez, 2 F.3d at 1357.
186. Id. at 1356.
187. Id. at 1357.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 1347.
190. Congress' efforts to regulate drugs in school zones is analogous to section 922(q).
See Schoolyard Drug Act, 21 U.S.C. § 860 (1993). Both regulate dangerous activities in a
school zone, and neither specifically requires a nexus with interstate commerce. Yet, the
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3. Support from Supreme Court Cases
Lopez then cites case law to support its holding.191 However, the
Lopez court fails to adequately address Supreme Court precedent on
the Commerce Clause. This is demonstrated by its pronouncement of
the rule that Congress must establish under what constitutional grant
of power it is legislating,"9 and demonstrate 3 that the activity being
regulated falls within that grant of power.' 94 The Lopez court held
that section 922(q)
plows thoroughly new ground and represents a sharp break with
the long standing pattern of federal firearms legislation... [be-
cause] neither the act itself nor its legislative history reflect any
congressional determination that the possession denounced by
section 922(q) is in any way related to interstate commerce or its
regulation, or, indeed, that Congress was exercising its powers
under the Commerce Clause.' 95
Finding support for this nexus requirement from Supreme Court
cases, however, required subtle and creative interpretation on the part
of the Lopez court.
Lopez observed that courts traditionally defer to congressional
findings "in the legislation itself and findings that can be inferred from
committee reports .. . [which provide] for some nexus to interstate
commerce."' 96 Courts will generally defer to such findings if they can
construe any rational basis for them.' 97 Lopez then lists recent cases
which have upheld statutes under Commerce Clause attacks by virtue
of congressional findings, as well as legislative history demonstrating a
nexus to interstate commerce. 98 Lopez found such a requirement im-
Schoolyard Drug Act has been upheld as constitutional. United States v. McDougherty,
920 F.2d 569, 572 (9th Cir. 1990).
191. Id at 1360.
192. Id. at 1364. "Indeed, as in this case, there is no substantial indication that the
commerce power was even invoked," implying that it is a necessity to indicate which power
is invoked. Id. (footnote omitted).
193. This demonstration may come from an explicit legislative finding in the statute
itself, or from the legislative history.
194. Lopez, 2 F.3d at 1367-68
We hold that section § 922(q) ... is invalid as beyond the power of Congress
under the Commerce Clause. Whether with adequate congressional findings or
legislative history, national legislation of similar scope could be sustained, we
leave for another day. Here we merely hold that Congress has not done what is
necessary to locate section 922(q) within the Commerce Clause.
Id. (footnote omitted).
195. Id. at 1366.
196. Id. at 1362.
197. Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 252 (1964).
198. Lopez, 2 F.3d at 1362.
Cases which have upheld statutes under Commerce Clause attacks on the basis of
congressional findings include EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226 (1983) (Age Discrimina-
plicit, although no language in any of these cases explicitly requires
that a statute contain such a demonstration.
The Supreme Court cases simply do not support the conclusion
that a congressional finding linking the regulated activity to interstate
commerce is required. To begin with, Lopez cites no case in which
this nexus requirement is explicitly stated. It merely infers this re-
quirement from the Supreme Court's reliance on legislative findings.
The Lopez court assumes that congressional findings are required for
all statutes because the Supreme Court often uses congressional find-
ings or legislative history to aid its review of the constitutionality of a
particular statute. Until the Court makes such a requirement explicit,
this is an unwarranted leap.
4. Distinguishing Adverse Supreme Court Language
Lopez recognized the existence of contrary Supreme Court case
law.199 Supreme Court cases have held that Congress need not make
findings of any sort to legislate.2°° For instance, in Perez v. United
States,"0 the Supreme Court noted that by referring to legislative find-
ings it did not mean "to infer that Congress need make particularized
findings in order to legislate." 2 Lopez ignored these words because
"[n]o citation of authority is given, nor is the meaning of the... sen-
tence entirely clear."2 3 Furthermore, Lopez found support for its leg-
islative finding requirement from the Supreme Court's de facto
reliance on such findings.?- 4 Thus, Lopez ignored the Supreme
Court's explicit language in Perez, and created a requirement that
Congress make findings.
In Woods v. Cloyd W. Miller Co.,205 the Supreme Court stated
that "the constitutionality of action taken by Congress does not de-
tion in Employment Act); FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742 (1982) (Public Utility Regula-
tory Policies Act); Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264
(1981) (Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act); Perez v. United States, 402 U.S.
146 (1971) (Consumer Credit Protection Act).
Cases which have upheld statutes under Commerce Clause attacks on the basis of
legislative history include Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964) (Civil Rights Act);
Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964) (Civil Rights Act).
199. Lopez, 2 F.3d at 1362 n.41.
200. See supra part I.B.
201. 402 U.S. 146 (1971).
202. Id. at 156.
203. Lopez, 2 F.3d at 1362 nA1.
204. Id. "[Tihe opinion [Perez] as a whole shows extensive consideration of and reli-
ance on not only the evidence before Congress and the legislative history, but also the
formal Congressional findings, which the Court had already observed were quite adequate
to the sustain the act." Id
205. 333 U.S. 138 (1948).
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pend on recitals of the power which it undertakes to exercise. '20 6 Lo-
pez disregards this precedent and requires that Congress specify under
what constitutional grant of power it is legislating for a statute to be
constitutional. Lopez supports this by pointing out that immediately
after this passage in Woods, the Supreme Court examined the legisla-
tive history in order to prove the constitutionality of the statute.20 7
Lopez opts to find the actions of the Court more persuasive than its
words, a view which does not comport with stare decisis. 20 8 Although
Lopez makes an almost plausible argument with very adverse case
law, ultimately the precedent is simply not in its favor.
While Lopez cites regularly to Supreme Court cases, and devel-
ops an extensive historical outline of federal firearms legislation, the
opinion's conclusion is fundamentally flawed. The Lopez court mis-
reads much of the relevant Supreme Court language. Lopez attempts
to curb Congress' commerce power by requiring a legislative finding
of constitutionality for statutes. While the motivation for such an at-
tempt may have merit, the precedent simply does not support it. In
addition, section 922(q) serves a vital function in restoring safety to
our schools.20 9
The Lopez court's view of section 922(q) is not unanimous among
the federal courts. Shortly after Lopez, section 922(q)'s constitution-
ality came before the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. The Ninth Cir-
cuit, United States v. Edwards,21 ° followed Supreme Court precedent
and upheld the statute as constitutional. The Edwards court's analysis
of section 922(q)'s constitutionality is ultimately more persuasive.
B. United States v. Edwards
On the afternoon of December 11, 1991, Ray Harold Edwards
was in the parking lot of Grant Union High School in Sacramento,
California with four other males.21' Four police officers approached
them and made brief conversation. 21 2 The police officers asked to
check the trunk of Edwards' car.213 After Edwards consented, the po-
lice officers found a .22 caliber rifle and a sawed-off bolt-action
rifle 4.2 1  Edwards was charged with violating section 922(q).215 Ed-
206. Id. at 144.
207. Lopez, 2 F.3d at 1364 n.45.
208. See supra note 72.
209. See supra text accompanying footnotes 4-9, and see infra text accompanying foot-
notes 311-315.
210. 13 F.3d 291 (9th Cir. 1993).




215. Id. at 291.
wards was convicted, and appealed to the Ninth Circuit.11 6
The sole issue before the court was the constitutionality of section
922(q). 2 17 Edwards argued that section 922(q) is an unconstitutional
exercise of congressional power under the Commerce Clause. 18 The
court disagreed, affirming Edwards' conviction and upholding the
constitutionality of section 922(q).219
First, the Edwards court distinguished United States v. Bass.220
Bass involved an issue of statutory interpretation, while the issue in
Edwards was whether the regulated activity must be explicitly linked
to interstate commerce under section 922(q). Therefore, Bass does
not apply to the constitutional analysis of section 922(q).
Edwards then cited United States v. Evans a" for the proposition
that "violence created through the possession of firearms adversely
affects the national economy, and that consequently, it was reasonable
for Congress to regulate the possession of firearms pursuant to the
Commerce Clause."''2 Evans also held that it is "unnecessary for
Congress to make express findings that a particular activity.., affects
interstate commerce." 223 Relying on precedent from its own circuit,
Edwards found that section 922(q) was constitutional without an ex-
press finding that interstate commerce was affected.
Edwards recognized that its decision to uphold section 922(q)
would create an intercircuit conflict with Lopez.224 However, the Ed-
wards court was unpersuaded by the view expressed in Lopez that
"[c]ourts cannot properly perform their duty to determine if there is
any rational basis for a congressional finding if neither the legislative
history nor the statute itself reveals any such relevant finding."'22 Ed-
wards found that Lopez ignored two Supreme Court cases which had
stated exactly the opposite.226 Both Perez'27 and Katzenbachz28 did
not require a legislative showing of a nexus with interstate commerce.
Edwards restated and followed the rule from these two cases: "Where
... Congress in adopting earlier legislation has found that the activity
sought to be regulated affects interstate commerce, additional hear-
216. Id. at 291.
217. Id. at 292.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 294.
220. 404 U.S. 336 (1971). See supra text part II.A.1.
221. 928 F.2d 858 (9th Cir. 1991).
222. Edwards, 13 F.3d at 293.
223. Id. at 293 (citing Evans, 928 F.2d at 862; see also Perez v. United States, 402 U.S.
146, 156 (1971); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 299 (1964)).
224. 13 F.3d at 294.
225. Id. at 1363-64.
226. Edwards, 13 F.3d at 294.
227. Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971).
228. Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
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ings and findings on this question are unnecessary." 229 In commenting
on the failure of the Lopez court to follow the language of Perez, the
Edwards court remarked that ignoring such precedent was "hereti-
cal."" 0  Unlike Lopez, Edwards followed the precedent of the
Supreme Court in holding that the courts need not locate congres-
sional findings which link the regulated activity to interstate com-
merce, and thereby upheld the constitutionality of section 922(q).23 1
C. District Court Cases Involving the Constitutionality of Section
922(q)
Federal district courts besides the Ninth and Fifth Circuits have
also reviewed the constitutionality of the Gun-Free Schools Zones
Act.23 2 Although these decisions are not binding on either the Ninth
or the Fifth Circuits, they offer further insight into the unsettled law
regarding preliminary findings by Congress. A majority of these fed-
eral district court cases uphold section 922(q)'s constitutionality, using
arguments similar to those articulated in Edwards.
In United States v. Holland, 3 a Third Circuit district court up-
held section 922(q).234 Holland cited Perez v. United States235 for the
proposition that Congress needs to make "specific findings of fact to
support its conclusion that a class of activity affects interstate com-
merce." 6 In this respect, the Holland court misreads Perez even
more erroneously than the Lopez court did. Perez simply does not
require Congress to make preliminary findings3 7 Nonetheless, Hol-
land upheld section 922(q) by finding that the requisite legislative his-
tory supported the statute2 38 Because the 1968 Omnibus Crime
229. Edwards, 13 F.3d at 295.
230. Id. 295 n.4 (9th Cir. 1993). "The Fifth Circuit's suggestion that an inferior federal
court is not bound by a ruling of the Supreme Court that is not supported by citation to
prior authority is baffling if not heretical. Because the Supreme Court is the highest court
in the land, any new principle of law it proclaims in interpreting the constitutionality of a
statute will of necessity be unsupported by any prior authority. Whether or not it is sup-
ported by citation to relevant precedent, an opinion of our Supreme Court becomes part of
the law of the United States which our oaths of office compel us to apply." ld.
231. Id. at 295-96.
232. See, e.g., United States v. Diego Ornelas, 841 F. Supp. 1087 (D. Colo. 1994);
United States v. Holland, 841 F. Supp. 143 (E.D. Pa. 1993); United States v. Morrow, 834
F. Supp. 364 (N.D. Ala. 1993).
233. 841 F. Supp. 143 (E.D. Pa. 1993).
234. Id. at 145.
235. 402 U.S. 146 (1971).
236. Holland, 841 F. Supp. at 144 (quoting Perez, 402 U.S. at 156).
237. As the Edwards court noted, "there is no lack of clarity in the Supreme Court's
holding that congressional findings are unnecessary in determining whether a reasonable
Congress would conclude that an activity affects interstate commerce." United States v.
Edwards, 13 F.3d 291, 295 (9th Cir. 1993).
238. Id. at 144.
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Control and Safe Streets Act contained legislative history which
linked the possession of firearms with interstate commerce, and the
Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1990 similarly regulated fire-
arms, Holland concluded that "[t]his legislative history is evidence
that Congress found that the regulated class of firearms had a substan-
tial effect on interstate commerce."' 39 Holland came to the correct
result by applying the wrong rule. Neither legislative history, nor find-
ings are required by Congress in order to legislate.
In United States v. Diego Ornelas,24 ° a Tenth Circuit district court
upheld section 922(q). Diego Ornelas interpreted Perez and other
Supreme Court cases similarly to Edwards, finding that no require-
ment exists for Congress to make particularized findings regarding
how a given activity relates to interstate commerce.241 Diego Ornelas
observed that "[t]he only function of the courts ... is to determine
whether the activity regulated is within the reach of the federal
power. '242 In doing so, courts may consider earlier legislation regulat-
ing activity within the same class of activities. 243 Since the original
section 922 enacted in 1968 found firearms to be linked to interstate
commerce, Diego Ornelas held that section 922(q) falls within the
reach of federal power.2' The Diego Ornelas court's opinion is both
reasonable and supported by precedent. Courts may, but are not re-
quired to consider legislative history when reviewing the constitution-
ality of statues.
Further, Diego Ornelas observed that legislation based on the
commerce power is rarely aimed at the regulation of commerce per se.
Therefore, requiring legislative findings merely creates an unnecessary
procedural task by mandating that Congress establish how an activity
relates to interstate commerce. "Congress simply would make the
requisite findings, which would have to be upheld 'if there is any ra-
tional basis' for them, and reenact the provision. '245 The accuracy of
these findings would only be called into question on the rare occasion
that a court could find no rational basis for them. The argument is
persuasive. It is doubtful that requiring such findings would motivate
Congress to conduct any serious constitutional analysis. The likely re-
sult would be that Congress would include findings composed of boil-
239. Id. at 144-45 (footnote omitted).
240. 841 F. Supp. 1087 (D. Colo. 1994).
241. Id. at 1090.
242. Id. at 1090-91 (citations omitted).
243. Id. at 1091.
244. Id. at 1091-92.
245. Id. at 1092-93 n.10. In fact, this is exactly what Congress did when it passed
amendments to 922(q) in the Crime Bill. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement
Act of 1994, H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 711, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. pg. 342 (1994). See infra part
III.
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erplate language in a mechanical fashion-hardly an improvement of
the current constitutional scheme.
The Diego Ornelas court came to its conclusion reluctantly. The
court was disturbed by the increasing scope of the Commerce Clause,
and the federalization of crimes traditionally regulated by the States.
"The current race to federalize state crimes epitomizes the very ten-
dency most feared by those who wrote and ratified the Constitution: a
strong central government relegating to itself all power." '246 Judge
Carrigan, writing for the Diego Ornelas court, made his concerns ex-
plicit when he concluded, "Were I not bound by precedents of the
Supreme Court and the Tenth Circuit, I would hold [section] 922(q)
unconstitutional."' 47 Judge Carrigan's approach to the constitutional-
ity of section 922(q) is admirable for its integrity. While he expresses
his disfavor of current Commerce Clause jurisprudence, he neverthe-
less feels compelled to follow such precedent. The Lopez opinion
lacks this intellectual honesty.
In United States v. Morrow,2" these same concerns about the
scope of the Commerce Clause led the Eleventh Circuit District Court
to find section 922(q) unconstitutional. Morrow used Lopez as per-
suasive authority for its decision:
This court joins the Fifth Circuit in expecting Congress at least
to share with the public, and with the overworked federal courts
upon which Congress thrusts the enforcement of an accelerating
volume of federal crime fighting statutes, some articulated, ra-
tional, constitutional basis for the federal government's assump-
tion of jurisdiction over the perceived problem.249
While the Morrow court does not explicitly require legislative find-
ings, it appears to encourage them. Morrow joins Lopez in attempting
to make Congress articulate a constitutional basis for its legislation.
While there may be some truth to the Morrow Court's observation
that the increase in federal criminal statutes has overburdened federal
courts,250 requiring congressional findings will not alleviate this prob-
lem. Any solutions to problems concerning the federalization of
crime do not lie in declaring section 922(q) unconstitutional for lack of
findings.
In January of 1994, two federal district courts for the District of
Kansas addressed the issue of section 922(q)'s constitutionality. The
first case was United States v. Trigg. 51 In Trigg, the court concluded
246. Diego Ornelas, 841 F.Supp. at 1093 n.11.
247. Id.
248. 834 F. Supp. 364 (N.D. Ala. 1993).
249. Id. at 365.
250. See infra text accompanying notes 308-310 for O'Connor's recent comments on the
federalization of criminal law.
251. 842 F. Supp. 450 (D. Kan. 1994).
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that section 922(q) was an unconstitutional exercise of Congress' com-
merce power.z '- After briefly summarizing Lopez and Edwards, the
court found that "the views articulated by the Fifth Circuit [were]
more faithful to the values of federalism embodied in our Constitu-
tion 5 3 The court held that, although "[t]here is no place for weap-
ons-particularly firearms-in and around schools. ... , Congress
must legislate in the area of firearms within the constraints imposed
by the Commerce Clause."'"z 4 With these general allusions to congres-
sional violation of federalism principles, the Trigg court held section
922(q) unconstitutional.
Ironically, and perhaps indicating the extent to which federal
courts are split on this issue, another district court in Kansas reached
the opposite conclusion only seven days later. In United States v.
Glover,"5 the court upheld section 922(q) as constitutional. After an
extensive analysis of both Lopez and Edwards, as well as many of the
district court cases cited above, the court held that although Perez "is
open to more than one interpretation," formal findings are not neces-
sary in order for Congress to legislate- 6
Tenth Circuit precedent also supported the Glover opinion. The
Tenth Circuit held in Morgan v. Secretary of Housing and Urban De-
velopment 7 that "the absence of formal findings concerning the ef-
fect on interstate commerce .. .does not prevent Congress from
regulating under the Commerce Clause."'' 58 The Glover court was
also motivated by the dire need to decrease violence in our schools.
In his opinion, Chief Judge Kelly asked whether legislative findings
are really more important than saving the lives of the nation's school
children.
In my view, given the situation as it exists in our present day
society, the time has come for the full weight of the United
States to be brought to bear in the area with which we are deal-
ing. It should have taken no hearing in 1990 for Congress to
recognize the use of weapons, particularly in concert with drug
activities and gang-related activities, seems to pervade our en-
tire society. Every city has been impacted. The senseless vio-
lence resulting from the use of these weapons-random
shootings, drive-by shootings-is commonplace. Regrettably,
our young folks today have taken up these practices. It would
appear that possession of a gun is a badge of honor. More im-
portantly, is not the school ground a most important vestige, the
252. Id. at 453.
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. 842 F. Supp. 1327 (D. Kan. 1994).
256. Id. at 1336.
257. 985 F.2d 1451 (10th Cir. 1993) (citations omitted).
258. Id. at 1455.
Fall 19941
208 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 22:179
one place where children are entitled to a safe and secure har-
bor free of fear and violence? Are not these children the na-
tion's future? Does Congress really need a hearing or further
findings to recognize the importance of it all? I think not.259
The issue of section 922(q)'s constitutionality has invoked a vari-
ety of opinions on the necessity of legislative findings, violence in
America, and our constitutional framework. The case law from the
lower courts is sharply divided. The Supreme Court faces another dif-.
ficulty in deciding Lopez, however. Congress has added an amend-
ment to section 922(q).
II. Recent Amendment to Section 922(q): Are Retroactive
Findings Enough to Save the Statute?
In the fall of 1993, perhaps in response to the Lopez decision, an
amendment to the Gun-Free School Zones Act was introduced in
both the House of Representatives and the Senate.260 This amend-
ment contains explicit findings which link the possession of guns
within a school zone to interstate commerce.26' Congress passed this
259. Glover, 842 F. Supp. at 1336-37.
260. Id. at 1327 (citing S. 1607, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993); H.R. 3355, 103d Cong., 1st
Sess. (1993)).
261. The amendment reads as follows:
Sec. 2972. Gun-Free School Zones. (a) Amendment of Title 18, United States
Code-Section 922(q) of Title 18, United States Code, is amended-
(1) by redesignating paragraphs (1), (2), and (3) as paragraphs (2), (3), and
(4), respectively; and
(2) by inserting after (q) the following new paragraph:
(1) the Congress finds and declares that-
(A) crime, particularly crime involving drugs and guns, is a pervasive, nation-
wide problem;
(B) crime at the local level is exacerbated by the interstate movement of
drugs, guns, and criminal gangs;
(C) firearms and ammunition move easily in interstate commerce and have
been found in increasing numbers in and around schools, as documented in nu-
merous hearings in both the Judiciary Committee of the House of Representa-
tives and Judiciary Committee of the Senate;
(D) in fact, even before the sale of a firearm, the gun, its component parts,
ammunition, and the raw materials from which they are made have considerably
moved in interstate commerce;
(E) while criminals freely move from state to state, ordinary citizens and
foreign visitors may fear to travel to or through certain parts of the country due to
concern about violent crime and gun violence, and parents may decline to send
their children to school for the same reason;
(F) the occurrence of violent crime in school zones has resulted in a decline
in the quality of education in our country;
(G) this decline in the quality of education has an adverse impact on inter-
state commerce and the foreign commerce of the United States;
(H) states, localities, and school systems find it almost impossible to handle
gun-related crime by themselves; even states, localities, and school systems that
have made strong efforts to prevent, detect, and punish gun-related crime find
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amendment as part of the Crime Bill in August, 1994.262 Seemingly,
the constitutional defects which the Lopez court found in section
922(q) are cured by this amendment. It is unclear, however, how the
Supreme Court will address these amendments.
The amendments to section 922(q) introduce complicated moot-
ness issues to the Lopez case. By providing findings which link the
possession of guns to interstate commerce, Congress seems to have
alleviated the need for a Supreme Court decision on the matter.
However, the confused state of the Supreme Court's recent mootness
jurisprudence leaves the exact procedural posture of Lopez in
doubt.263
As an initial matter, the Court may address the newly amended
version of section 922(q). In Fusari v. Steinberg,2" the Supreme Court
granted certiorari to review the constitutionality of the unemployment
benefit hearing procedures in Connecticut. After the Court granted
certiorari, but prior to the issuance of its decision, the Connecticut
legislature amended the statute in question to eliminate any constitu-
tional defects.2 65 The Court noted that although the amendments
"may alter significantly the character of the system ... [t]his Court
must review the District Court's judgment in light of presently existing
Connecticut law, not the law in effect at the time that judgment was
rendered. 'z6 6 This rule is supported by a long line of cases.2 67 The
more difficult issue is whether the Supreme Court will address the
their efforts unavailing due in part to the failure or inability of other states or
localities to take strong measures; and
(I) Congress has power, under the interstate Commerce Clause and other
provisions of the Constitution, to enact measures to ensure the integrity and
safety of the nation's schools by enactment of this subsection.
Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, H.R. REP. 7 11, 103d Cong., 2d
Sess. 342 (1994).
262. Id.
263. A case becomes moot when the Court's jurisdiction is terminated by a change in
the circumstances of the controversy. ROBERT L. S'R Er kA.., SuPREME COURT PRAc-
Tic (6th ed. 1986). See also A. Greenbaum, Mootness on Appeal in Federal Courts: A
Reexamination of the Consequences of Appellate Disposition, 17 U.C. DAvis L. Rav. 7
(1983).
264. 419 U.S. 379 (1975).
265. Id. at 385.
266. Id. at 386-87.
267. See, e.g., Diffenderfer v. Central Baptist Church, 404 U.S. 412, 414 (1972)("We
must review the judgment of the District Court in light of Florida law as it now stands, not
as it stood when the judgment below was entered."); Hall v. Beals, 396 U.S. 45, 48 (1969)
("We review the judgment below in light of the Colorado statute as it now stands, not as it
once did."); Thorpe v. Houston Auth., 393 U.S. 268,281-82 (1969) ("The general rule ... is
that an appellate court must apply the law in effect at the time it renders its decision.");
United States v. Alabama, 362 U.S. 602, 604 (1960) ("Under familiar principles, the case
must be decided on the basis of law now controlling."); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52,
60 (1941).
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amended version of section 922(q), whether it will dismiss certiorari as
improvidently granted, or whether it will remand the case to the Dis-
trict Court for further proceedings in light of the statutory change.
In Northeastern Florida Contractors v. Jacksonville,268 the most
recent case involving an intervening statutory change after the grant
of certiorari, the Court reviewed the amended version of the statute.
In Northeastern Florida Contractors, the plaintiff challenged the con-
stitutionality of a city ordinance which required that ten percent of
city contracts be set aside for "Minority Business Enterprises. '269 Af-
ter the Supreme Court granted certiorari the city repealed the ordi-
nance, replacing it with a new ordinance which reduced the number of
contracts to be set aside.270 The city argued that the case had become
moot due to intervening changes in the ordinance. The Court, how-
ever, invoked the "voluntary cessation" doctrine, and held that the
case was not moot. The Court applied the "'well settled' rule that 'a
defendant's voluntary cessation of a challenged practice does not de-
prive a federal court of its power to determine the legality of the prac-
tice."' 27 Under this analysis, the Supreme Court is free to address
the newly amended version of section 922(q) in Lopez.
The Supreme Court also justified its holding in Northeastern Flor-
ida Contractors by observing that the statutory changes were not sig-
nificant. In the Court's opinion, the new ordinance was not
"sufficiently altered so as to present a substantially different contro-
versy than the one the District Court originally decided."2 72 Because
the statute was essentially the same, the Court could address the
amended version. Under this analysis, the Court would also be able
to review the newly amended version of section 922(q). The amend-
ments to section 922(q) only add findings to the preamble of the stat-
ute.273 Therefore, the Court may find that the changes are minor and
do not abate the pending controversy. As a result, the Court may
choose to address the newly amended statute directly.
The dissenters in Northeastern Florida Contractors felt that the
intervening statutory changes made the case moot. "It seems clear,"
they wrote, "that when the challenged law is revised so as plainly to
cure the alleged defect.., there is no live controversy for the Court to
decide."'274  The dissenters cited Diffenderfer v. Central Baptist
268. 113 S. Ct. 2297 (1993).
269. Id. at 2299.
270. Id. at 2300.
271. Id. at 2301 (quoting City of Mesquite v. Aladdin's Castle, Inc., 455 U.S. 283, 289
(1982)).
272. Id. at 2301 n.3.
273. See supra note 261.
274. Id. at 2305.
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Church275 in support of this proposition. Diffenderfer involved a Flor-
ida statute that exempted church property from taxation, even if it
was used for primarily commercial purposes. 276 The plaintiff chal-
lenged the statute asserting that it violated the First Amendment's Es-
tablishment and Free Exercise Clauses.277 While the case was pending
before the Supreme Court, the statute was repealed and replaced with
a new statute that only exempted church property used predominantly
for religious purposes.27 The Court held that the case was moot, va-
cated the judgment of the district court, and remanded the case to the
district court with leave to the appellants to amend their pleadings.279
Diffenderfer would seem to clearly support the Northeastern Florida
Contractors dissent's view of the mootness issue. Diffenderfer is also
supported by a long line of cases before it."0 If the Supreme Court
should choose to disregard Northeastern Florida Contractors and re-
sume its previous line of mootness cases, it may vacate the judgment
of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals and remand to the district court
with leave to the defendant to amend his pleading to challenge the
newly amended statute." 1
Although the mootness principles enunciated in Northeastern
Florida Contractors and Diffenderfer seem generally applicable,
neither of those cases are factually analogous to Lopez since neither
involve a constitutional challenge to a federal criminal statute. United
States Department of the Treasury v. Galioto282 involves similar facts.
In Galioto, the plaintiff challenged the constitutionality of a federal
firearms statute.283 Eighteen U.S.C. § 922(d) prohibited firearm sales
to persons who had been committed to a mental hospital.284 The
plaintiff argued that section 922(d) violated the Equal Protection
Clause.2 5 Prior to the Supreme Court's decision, Congress redrafted
275. 404 U.S. 412 (1972).
276. Id.
277. Id.
278. Id. at 414.
279. Id. at 415.
280. Fusari v. Steinberg, 419 U.S. 379,380 (1975) (vacating decision of the district court
and remanding for reconsideration in light of the intervening changes in Connecticut law);
Sanks v. Georgia, 401 U.S. 144, 153 (1971) (dismissing appeal and remanding to the Geor-
gia Supreme Court in light of statutory changes); Thorpe v. Houston Auth., 393 U.S. 268,
281-82 (1969) (reversing and remanding in light of the intervening changes in HUD hous-
ing authority guidelines); United States v. Alabama, 362 U.S. 602, 604 (1960) (vacating
judgments of the court of appeals and the district court, and remanding case in light of
newly enacted Civil Rights Act).
281. It is not entirely clear how mootness principles in civil cases pertain to a criminal
case like Lopez.
282. 477 U.S. 556 (1986).
283. Id. at 558.
284. Id. at 557.
285. Id. at 558-59.
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the statute, allowing former mental patients to apply to the Secretary
of the Treasury for permission to buy a firearm. The Supreme Court
noted, "This enactment significantly alters the posture of this case."'2 6
Because the equal protection issues had become moot, the Court va-
cated and remanded the judgment of the district court.' Once again,
the Court remanded a changed statute to the district court for
reconsideration.
Seemingly, Galioto provides guidance for the Supreme Court in
the Lopez decision. However, Lopez differs from Galioto. Lopez in-
volves a criminal acquittal, whereas Galioto involves only a challenge
to a statute preventing former mental patients from buying firearms.
In Galioto, the case was remanded because remaining issues were best
addressed by the district court. Lopez does not have any factual is-
sues left to address. The only new considerations are the findings
which were added by the amendment. In addition, there may be an ex
post facto principle which bars the district court from reinstituting the
same proceeding against the defendant with the newly amended ver-
sion of the statute.
How the Supreme Court will view Lopez after the amendments
to section 922(q) is unclear. The Court will probably follow Diffender-
fer and vacate the judgments of the court of appeals and the district
court, remanding for proceedings in light of the newly amended stat-
ute. In essence, this would mean reinstating the initial trial and reliti-
gating the issue of section 922(q)'s constitutionality. However, the
Court may choose to follow Northeastern Florida Contractors and re-
view the newly amended version of section 922(q) itself. Of.course,
the Court would first have to find that the amendments did not signifi-
cantly alter the statute. As a practical matter, the Supreme Court may
pursue a number of options and will decide the Lopez case if it finds it
compelling to do so. Ultimately, the broader issues of the scope of the
Commerce Clause, 8 the Tenth Amendment, and the boundaries of
286. Id. at 559.
287. Id. at 560.
288. The Supreme Court may choose to address whether section 922(q) is a constitu-
tional exercise of the Commerce Clause as a substantive matter, beyond the legitimacy of
the Fifth Circuit's findings requirement. This is an issue which Lopez did not reach. Sec-
tion 922(q) should withstand this form of constitutional review as well. The Supreme
Court should uphold section 922(q) if it can perceive any rational basis by which the pos-
session of a firearm within a school zone affects interstate commerce. Heart of Atlanta
Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 258-59 (1964); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294,
303-04 (1964). Possession of firearms within a school zone also substantially affects inter-
state commerce under a number of arguments. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 124
(1942). First, violent schools detract from the quality of education, which reduces the com-
petency of American students and damages our competitiveness internationally. Brief for
the United States Attorney General at 22, United States v. Lopez, 2 F.3d 1342 (5th Cir.
1993) (No. 93-1260). Second, because drug free school zones have been upheld as constitu-
our federal system may inspire the Court to issue its own opinion
rather than remand the case for further proceedings.289
IV. Tenth Amendment and Federalism Implications of
Section 922(q)
While the cases analyzing the constitutionality of section 922(q)
focus on the narrow issue of whether legislative findings are required,
broader federalism concerns under the Tenth Amendment lie at the
heart of the issue. Commerce Clause and Tenth Amendment analyses
are really opposite sides of the same coin.290 An issue involving the
scope of the Commerce Clause is simultaneously an issue of state sov-
ereignty under the Tenth Amendment. "In the end, just as a cup may
be half empty or half full, it makes no difference whether one views
the question ... as one of ascertaining the limits of the power dele-
gated to the Federal Government under the affirmative provisions of
the Constitution or one of discerning the core of sovereignty retained
by the States under the Tenth Amendment."'2 91 Thus, a handful of
courts have analyzed section 922(q)'s constitutionality by framing
their arguments in terms of whether Congress had invaded an area of
traditional state sovereignty under the Tenth Amendment.
In Lopez, the court noted that it drew support for its conclusion
concerning the importance of congressional findings from "recent
holdings that when Congress wishes to stretch its commerce power so
far as to intrude upon state prerogatives, it must express its intent to
do so in a perfectly clear fashion. '' 292 The Lopez court began with the
premise that both the regulation of schools and firearms have been
areas traditionally left to the states.2 93 This proposition is debatable.
The Lopez court itself details the extensive history of gun control
measures that Congress has undertaken during this century. 94 Such a
history hardly supports the theory that firearm statutes are tradition-
ally within the exclusive jurisdiction of the states. 95
tional, so should gun-free school zones. United States v. Holland, 841 F. Supp. 143, 144
(E.D. Pa. 1993). Third, firearm violence is a national health problem. Brief for National
School Safety Center, United States v. Lopez, 2 F.3d 1342 (5th Cir. 1993) (No. 93-1260)
(citing M. Rosenberg et al., Let's Be Clear: Violence Is A Public Health Problem, 267
JAMA 3071 (1992)).
289. See infra part IV.
290. The Tenth Amendment provides, "The powers not delegated to the United States
by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the states respec-
tively, or to the people." U.S. CONST. amend. X.
291. New York 112 S. Ct. at 2419.
292. United States v. Lopez, 2 F.3d 1342, 1365 (5th Cir. 1993).
293. Id. at 1347.
294. Id.
295. See supra text accompanying note 165.
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The court in United States v. Diego Ornelas296 also invoked Tenth
Amendment arguments, although it ultimately held that section
922(q) was a constitutional exercise of the commerce power.
Although the court felt bound by Supreme Court precedent to uphold
the statute, it expressed its concern with the federalization of criminal
law:
[I]n its haste to define as federal crimes conduct traditionally
subject only to state or local regulation and prosecution, Con-
gress is stretching the commerce power far beyond its intended
scope, and thus emasculating the Tenth Amendment's clear in-
tent to reserve regulation of conduct that does not affect inter-
state commerce to the states and the people.
•.. If the Tenth Amendment retains any vitality whatever
in the area of criminal law, that remnant is fast being eroded.297
The Diego Ornelas court's primary concern with the federalization of
criminal law is that often state and federal laws will overlap.2 98 This
creates the unfair result of disparate punishments for virtually identi-
cal crimes depending on whether the criminal defendant is punished
under state or federal law. Federal prosecutors can, at their discre-
tion, "choose either to prosecute under a harsh federal statute or
leave the matter to state prosecution under a comparatively lenient
statute."29 9 The Diego Ornelas court remains unconvinced by the ra-
tionale of Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority.3"
While states should theoretically be able to rely on the national polit-
ical process to prevent Congress from invading state sovereignty, in
reality they cannot because "irresistible political pressures to be per-
ceived as 'tough on crime' are driving Congress to federalize crimes
such as that here charged, in circumstances where clear-minded, ob-
jective analysis can discern no meaningful effect on interstate com-
merce in the sense intended by the Commerce Clause." '' Thus, while
the Diego Ornelas court felt constrained by precedent to uphold sec-
tion 922(q) as constitutional, it presented strong Tenth Amendment
and pragmatic arguments to overturn the statute.30 2
United States v. Morrow"3 also invoked arguments based on the
296. 841 F. Supp. 1087, 1090 (D.Colo. 1994).
297. Id. at 1093 n.11 (emphasis added).
298. In fact, sixteen states have enacted their own versions of the Gun-Free School
Zones Act. This may be due in part to their concern that section 922(q) will be struck
down as unconstitutional. Greg Lucas, School Gun-Free Zone OKd, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 30,
1994, at Al.
299. Diego Ornelas, 841 F. Supp. at 1093 n.11.
300. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
301. 841 F. Supp. at 1093.
302. Id.
303. 834 F. Supp. 364 (N.D. Ala. 1993).
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Tenth Amendment to find section 922(q) unconstitutional. The Mor-
row court chastised Congress for its limitless use of the Commerce
Clause in legislation. For instance, the court noted that
Congress expects courts invariably to presume that Congress in-
tends to hang any and all new federal legislation which purports
to control activity within the several states on the so-called
Commerce Clause, without Congress having to say so. After all,
has not everyone been conditioned to believe that there is noth-
ing which moves or has ever moved which does not support an
invocation of the Commerce Clause as the means for conferring
federal jurisdiction and control over the activity and/or problem
that Congress wishes to govern and/or solve[?]3"
The Morrow court continued:
Although the Congress has systematically whittled away at the
old idea of the superiority inherent in the local solution of
problems, the principle of federalism still has enough vitality to
demand an explanation from Congress when Congress finds that
the states' various means of handling a particular societal prob-
lem are so ineffectual as to be moribund and in need of replace-
ment by an overarching new federal remedy. 05
Bitterly protesting the erosion of the traditional federalism balance,
Morrow held section 922(q) unconstitutional.
The Morrow court overstates the point. Section 922(q) does not
"replace" state criminal law, it merely supplements it. Section
922(q)(3) provides explicitly that "[n]othing in this subsection shall be
construed as preempting or preventing a state or local government
from enacting a statute establishing gun free school zones as provided
in this subsection. '3 6 State and local authorities are thereby free to
prosecute under their respective laws.
As discussed, the Supreme Court's recent Tenth Amendment ju-
risprudence has been turbulent.0 7 The Court may be prepared to ad-
dress Tenth Amendment considerations in section 922(q). Comments
made earlier this year by Justice O'Connor indicate a continued inter-
est in exploring issues of federalism that began in her opinion in New
York v. United States.3" 8 In an address to the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals conference, Justice O'Connor attacked the Crime Bill as part
of a dangerous trend to federalize criminal law. "Congress seems to
be moving clearly in the direction of recognizing national problems
and deciding that the way to deal with them is to federalize the issues
304. Id. at 365.
305. Id.
306. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(3).
307. See supra text accompanying footnotes 108-135.
308. 112 S. Ct. 2408 (1992).
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and bring them into federal courts."30 9 She went on to explain that
this trend could have a "drastic effect on the federal bench" since
criminal cases make up roughly a third of court caseloads.310 If the
Court chooses to do so, the Lopez opinion may provide a vehicle for
addressing the federalism balance.
The Tenth Amendment arguments discussed above are persua-
sive in theory. However, viewed in the context of the Lopez opinion,
they are considerably less persuasive. Lopez focuses on the narrow
issue of whether Congress must make preliminary findings in order to
legislate. Even if the Lopez findings requirement is upheld by the
Supreme Court, this requirement will not alleviate Tenth Amendment
concerns. Because Congress typically does not regulate commerce
when it invokes the Commerce Clause, requiring Congress to make a
legislative finding amounts to little more than a procedural technical-
ity. Congress need only include boilerplate language at the beginning
of the statute which alleges that the regulated activity affects interstate
commerce. Section 922(q) would presumably be constitutional, for in-
stance, if one sentence was included somewhere in the legislative his-
tory saying that possession of firearms affects interstate commerce
because fewer tourists will travel in that state as a result of the in-
creased violence. Congress need not actually possess a sincere belief
that the activity affects interstate commerce, nor provide any evidence
that it does. Findings alone will not cure infringements on state sover-
eignty. If the Supreme Court wishes to address federalism, it should
change the substantive Tenth Amendment jurisprudence rather than
uphold what is merely a trivial procedural requirement.
Ultimately, section 922(q)'s constitutionality hinges on whether
legislative findings are more important than saving our schools from
the threat of gun violence. Even the most cursory look at our schools
indicates that they are in a state of emergency. Section 922(q) serves
an essential function in restoring sanity in our education system. Cur-
rently, the National School Safety Center estimates that more than
100,000 students carry guns to school every day. 1' In 1987, more than
250,000 students brought a handgun to school at least once.312 "Stu-
dents in Chicago, New York, Miami, and elsewhere are exhibiting
signs of post traumatic stress syndrome.' Young children exposed to
violence in the schools... have become numb-seemingly immune to
sights of brutality in the same way as the children of Belfast, Beirut, or
309. Harriet Chiang, O'Connor Says Crime Bill Would Overload Federal Courts, S.F.
CHRON., Aug. 17, 1994, at A3.
310. Id.
311. Brief for Petitioners at 4, United States v. Lopez, 2 F.3d 1342 (5th Cir. 1993) (No.
93-1260) (citing 136 CONG. REc. 1165 (1990)(comment by Senator Kohl)).
312. Id.
Johannesburg." ' Schools in fifteen states search students with metal
detectors, and many school systems are using gun sniffing dogs and
SWAT teams.314 A National Education Association and National
PTA summarized the effects of this violence succinctly, "[t]he threat
of violence is a significant factor in the dropout rate, the stress related
to fear of violence threatens the educational goals related to student
achievement and fear of violence impedes the ability of schools to at-
tract and retain qualified school personnel. 3 15 The Supreme Court
should carefully weigh the practical effect of holding section 922(q)
unconstitutional. Concern for the safety of our schools should out-
weigh the need for a congressional procedure as trivial and useless as
the findings requirement.
V. Conclusion
United States v. Lopez, while making creative use of Supreme
Court precedent, wrongly held section 922(q) unconstitutional. No re-
quirement has ever existed for Congress to make legislative findings
which link the activity being regulated with a constitutional grant of
power. Reviewing statutes for constitutionality has traditionally been
the courts' responsibility. Nor is there any reason to create such a
requirement now. In addition, any federalism concerns are out-
weighed by the need to decrease gun violence in our schools. Section
922(q) serves a valuable purpose. The importance of this statute
should preclude the Court from voiding it based on technicalities. In
his dissent in New York v. United States, Justice White made an argu-
ment that applies here:
Ultimately, I suppose, the entire structure of our federal consti-
tutional government can be traced to an interest in establishing
checks and balances to prevent the exercise of tyranny against
individuals. But these fears seem extremely far distant to me in
a situation such as this. We face a crisis of national proportions
... For me, the Court's civics lecture has a decidedly hollow ring
at a time when action, rather than rhetoric, is needed to solve a
national problem.316
Similarly, the Lopez reasoning puts the "procedural cart before the
substantive horse.13 17 In deciding the constitutionality of section
313. Id. (quoting SUBCOMMrrrEE ON CRIME OF THE HOUSE Comm. ON THE JUDICIARY,
101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990) (statements of witnesses before the subcommittee) [hereinafter
House Hearings]).
314. Id. at 20 (citing HousE HEARINGS at 39).
315. Id. at 20 (citing HousE HEARINGS at 44).
316. 112 S. Ct. 2408, 2444 (1992)(White, J., dissenting)(discussing the constitutionality
of the Low Level Radioactive Waste Act).
317. Amicus Brief of the National Sch. Safety Ctr., United States v. Lopez, 2 F.3d 1342
(5th Cir. 1993) (No. 93-1260) (available in LEXIS, Genfed library, Briefs file).
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922(q), the Court should keep the relevant precedent and the impor-
tance of the Gun-Free School Zones Act at the forefront of its consid-
erations. The Supreme Court should reverse United States v. Lopez
and uphold section 922(q) as constitutional.
